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S U M M A R Y
We report here a fatal case of laboratory conﬁrmed Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), which
caused nosocomial infection in eight health care workers (HCWs), who had provided medical care for the
patient. All the HCWs survived.
The report demonstrates that airborne transmission of CCHF is a real risk, at least when the CCHF
patient is in a ventilator. During performance of any aerosol-generating medical procedures for any CCHF
patient airborne precautions should always be added to standard precautions, in particular, airway
protective N95 mask or equivalent standard, eye protection, single airborne precaution room, or a well-
ventilated setting.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Human cases of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF)
most frequently occur among agricultural workers or inhabitants
of rural areas after bites of infected Hyalomma ticks or direct
contact with ticks, for instance, by removing ticks by unprotected
hands, and more rarely among slaughterhouse workers exposed to
the blood and tissues of infected livestock and medical personnel
through contact with the body ﬂuids of infected patients.1–4
The South-Western regions of Russia (Astrakhan, Rostov and
Volgograd, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, Kalmykia, Dagestan
and Ingushetia Republics) are endemic for CCHF.5,6 1,654 CCHF
cases with 73 fatalities (CFR 4,4%) were recorded from 1999 to
2013.7 More than 400 cases of CCHF were diagnosed in the Rostov
region alone from 2000 to 2013.
Nosocomial cases of CCHF among health workers (HCWs) in
Russia are rare, and are connected with direct contact between
infected blood and unprotected skin or eye mucosa. In the Rostov
region nosocomial cases were reported in 1961 (1 person), 1966
(2 persons) and in 1999 (5 persons)8; isolated cases have also been
identiﬁed in 2003, 2006 and 2007. Between 1999 and 2005* Corresponding author.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).6 nosocomial CCHF cases among HCWs were recorded in the
Stavropol region.9
In May 2011 a nosocomial cluster was registered among eight
HCWs who had provided medical care for a patient with CCHF in
the central district hospital in Salsk district of the Rostov region.
The peculiarity of this cluster was that not only the direct but also
airborne transmission of CCHF probably took place. The cluster was
described in an ofﬁcial letter of Federal Service for Surveillance on
Consumer Rights Protection and Wellbeing of the Russian
Federation (Rospotrebnadzor)10 and mentioned in a number of
publications in Russian.8,11,12
A nosocomial CCHF cluster with possible airborne transmission
has not been described previously; its description is provided
below according to Russian sources.8,10–12 We also took part in the
investigation of this cluster and treatment of patients.
1.1. Index case
A 23-year-old pregnant woman (22 weeks of pregnancy) was
admitted to the infectious diseases department of the central
district hospital in the Salsk district of the Rostov region on 6 May
2011 (1st day of illness) with initial suspicion of inﬂuenza-like
illnesses (ILI) and pyelonephritis. She lived in a rural area endemic
for CCHF, and denied any tick bites or contacts with ticks within the
2 weeks before onset of the disease. She was on a countryside
picnic 2 - 3 days before the debut of symptoms. An X-rayciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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uria and leukocyturia were found. Urine culture tests were not
performed. The patient was started on antibiotics and symp-
tomatic therapy. On the 8th of May she became hypoxic and
needed nasal oxygen. Increased bleeding from the catheter and
hematomas in places of intramuscular injections were observed
May 8-9.
CCHF was clinically diagnosed and laboratory conﬁrmed by PCR
and anti-CCHF speciﬁc IgM both being positive on the 5th day of
disease (May 9, 2011). Ribavirin was not administered to the
patient because of the pregnancy, anemia (Hb below 10 g/dl) and
late stage of the disease. The patient’s condition started to
deteriorate from May 10 and she developed severe double sided
pneumonia, hematemesis, hemoptysis, metrostaxis, and haemor-
rhage from the subclaviar catheter.
The patient continued to receive antibiotics, plasma, thrombo-
cyte concentrates, erythrocyte concentrates and other support
therapy. The patient also received mucolytics and broncholytics
through compression inhaler NEBULFLAEM on May 9-10. During
this period of time she was not on ventilation. Due to a low oxygen
saturation the patient was intubated on May 10 and mechanically
ventilated until her death on May 11, 2011. (7th day of illness).
During the medical care of the patient 3 physicians, 4 nurses
and 1 hospital attendant contracted CCHF. All 8 HCWs developed
CCHF between May 12 and May 15, 2011 and were hospitalized
between May 14-16, 2011 with inﬂuenza-like illnesses (ILI) and
suspicion of CCHF. All patients had fever (38—39.58C), fatigue,
headache, chills, body aches; 3 persons had hemorrhages at the site
of injection; 2 persons had sore throat. CCHF was conﬁrmed by RT-
PCR and serological assays (anti-CCHF speciﬁc IgM ELISA in high
titers 1/1800-1/6400) in all 8 cases.
More information about secondary cases is provided below.
Secondary cases:
#1. Nurse from infectious diseases department, who performed
intravenous injections through a catheter, and monitored
inhalation use hourly;
#2. Nurse from the infectious diseases department, who
assisted in central venous catheterization, performed intrave-
nous injections through a catheter, and monitored inhalation
use hourly;
#3. Nurse from the intensive care unit (ICU) department, who
installed the equipment for artiﬁcial lung ventilation (ALV)
within a 20 minute period. She had no direct or potential
indirect contact with the patient’s body or her biological ﬂuids,
and did not participate in inhalation or ventilation of the
patient;
#4. Hospital attendant from the infectious diseases department,
who performed change of linen, cleaning room, and disinfection
of the bedpan;
#5. Anesthetist from the ICU, who was in the ICU ward not more
than 10 min, while the patient was in the ventilator. She had no
direct or potential indirect contact with the patient or her
biological ﬂuids, and did not participate in inhalation or
ventilation of the patient;
#6. Clinician from the infectious diseases department who
attended the patient, doing rounds when she was in the
ventilator. This physician also treated 2 more CCHF patients at
the same time.
#7. Anesthesiologist from the ICU who took care of the
ventilator treatment (ALV) of the patient in ICU;
#8. Obstetrician from the gynecology department who exam-
ined the patient from the ﬁrst day of admission to the hospital
until the death of the index patient.
All HCWs survived.2. Discussion
Epidemiological investigation established that all HCWs
worked in the patient’s room during potential exposure period
without goggles and particulate respirator, and used only gloves,
disposable surgical masks and gowns. This set of personal
protective equipment (PPE) does not protect skin, conjunctiva
and upper respiratory tract against aerosols which could contain
the particles of sputum streaked with infected blood, from the
patient, who throughout her stay in the hospital was located in an
isolation room without negative pressure. We cannot exclude that
HCWs (#1,#2, #4,##6-8), who had direct contact with body or
biological ﬂuids of the patient, could have used their PPE in an
inappropriate manner, for example, incorrectly put on and/or
taken off their PPE. But 2 HCWs (#3 and #5) had no direct or
indirect contact with body or ﬂuids of the patients and also used
the above mentioned PPE. Only 3 HCWs (#1, #2 and #7) in this
cluster were directly involved in the performance of the aerosol-
generating procedures (inhalation, intubation, ventilation); the
other 5 HCWs provided medical care for the patient or supervised
the equipment.
We found only two previous reports indicating the possibility of
aerosol transmission of CCHF13,14 and descriptions of 2 cases in a
recent report from Turkey which described possible aerosol
transmission of CCHF to HCWs while they were performing
intubation and ventilation of a child and the resuscitation of an
adult patient.15
In this nosocomial cluster which took place in Russia 2 HCWs
out of 8 secondary cases (cases #3 and #5) probably became
infected through airborne transmission during their short stay in
the patient’s room, where at that time aerosol-generating
procedures were being performed.
We believe that four core factors are important for this
nosocomial train of transmission:
1. probably infected aerosols which could spread in the ward
during performance of aerosol-generating medical procedures
(AGMPs) - inhalation and ILV;
2. high level of viremia on the 5-6th day of disease without
antiviral treatment (ribavirin);
3. inappropriate usage of PPE when AGMPs were performing;
4. poor ventilation of the patient’s ward;
which could all lead to aerosol transmission of CCHF.
According to the ofﬁcial statement of Rospotrebnadzor10 in
6 secondary cases, there was a high risk of combined direct and
airborne transmission, in 2 secondary cases direct CCHF transmis-
sion was not proven.
This case of airborne transmission of CCHF demonstrates that
during performance of any AGMPs for any CCHF patient, airborne
precautions should always be added to standard precautions
(particulate respirator protective to N95 or equivalent standard,
eye protection, single airborne precaution room or well-ventilated
setting, etc.) according to WHO guidelines16 for all HCWs who are
in a patient’s room. Access to any room where the aerosol-
generating procedures are performed should be extremely limited.
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